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“Always remember: If you’re alone in the kitchen and you 
drop the lamb, you can always just pick it up. Who’s going 
to know?” 
— Julia Child1 
ABSTRACT 
As any chef will tell you, cooking and food preparation is a 
creative, sometimes innovative, endeavor.  Much thought and time 
is invested in selecting ingredients, developing the process for 
preparing the dish, and designing an interesting or appealing look 
and feel for a food item.  If this is true, then it should come as no 
surprise that recipes, food designs, and other culinary creations 
can be protected by various forms of intellectual property, 
namely: trade secrets, design and utility patents, trade dress, but 
usually not copyright.  This article considers how intellectual 
property law has been applied to protect recipes and food designs, 
along with broader issues relating to how these rights may 
overlap and their implications for competition. 
INTRODUCTION 
 “One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined 
well.”2  We are a society that has become increasingly obsessed with food.  
Food and cooking shows are television’s fastest-growing subgenre.3  Food 
blogging has become a lucrative industry.4  One can go to any fine dining 
establishment and observe patrons taking pictures of their food and posting 
those pictures on their social media before digging in.  A unique recipe 
might be the core asset of a specialty restaurant.5  Not unexpectedly, chefs, 
 
* Chair and Professor, Department of Business Law, California State University, 
Northridge. 
**Adjunct Professor of Business Law, California State University, Northridge. 
1 Mike Sager, Julia Child: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE (Aug. 15, 2014), 
https://www.esquire.com/food-drink/interviews/a1273/julia-child-quotes-
0601/#ixzz1uygKZ7hJ. 
2 VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 23 (Harcourt, Inc. 1929). 
3 Michael O’Connell, Welcome to Peak Food TV: Inside Hollywood’s Growing 
Hunger for Culinary Shows, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 19, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/features/gordon-ramsay-more-hollywoods-
growing-hunger-food-tv-shows-1225214. 
4 One food blog, Pinch of Yum, reports that in just one month (November 2016), 
it brought in over $95,000 in revenue.  See Jillian Kramer, How to Make a Living 
as a Food Blogger, FOOD & WINE (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.foodandwine.com/news/make-living-food-blogger. 
5 Some examples of well-known “signature dishes” include the Brown Derby’s 
cobb salad, Spago’s house-smoked salmon pizza, and Nobu’s black cod with 
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restaurant owners, and others involved in the culinary world often consider 
their recipes and food designs to be creatively invented works of art.  As 
such, can recipes and food design be protected by intellectual property 
rights that are available to more traditional inventions and forms of art? 
 This article explores whether two aspects of food preparation – 
recipes and the design of the food itself – are eligible for protection by the 
principal forms of intellectual property.  In Part I, this article explores the 
various forms of available intellectual property protection: trade secrets, 
copyright, utility and design patents, and trademarks and trade dress.  
Next, we analyze whether and how intellectual property rights have been 
used to protect recipes and food design.  The article concludes that the 
availability of intellectual property protection for recipes and food design, 
and the requirements for such protection, varies greatly depending on the 
form of protection sought.  For both recipes and food design, copyright 
offers limited or no protection.  Recipes may find some protection with 
trade secrets and utility patents.  Food design may be eligible for both 
design patent and trade dress protection.  The strongest protection for food 
designs may arise from some combination of the two. 
 In Part II, this article explores whether there should be intellectual 
property protection for recipes and food design at all and, if so, under what 
circumstances.  There is existing intellectual property protection for 
various items: dinosaur-shaped crackers, heart-shaped candy canes, 
irregular-shaped hamburger patties, cupcakes with swirl icing, hot dogs 
with crisscross cuts, among other food designs.  We consider whether such 
broad protection serves or hinders the purposes of intellectual property 
protection.  Finally, we address how existing intellectual property law 
enables an owner of a food design to circumvent the Supreme Court’s 
requirement that product designs have secondary meaning before they are 
entitled to trademark protection by permitting the owner to initially seek 
design patent protection, use its period of limited monopoly to develop 
secondary meaning, and thereafter obtain potentially infinite trademark 
protection.  
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR 
RECIPES AND FOOD DESIGN 
 The best known forms of available intellectual property protection 
are trade secrets, copyrights, utility and design patents, and trademarks and 
trade dress.  In this part, we consider whether and to what extent 
intellectual property rights have been used to protect recipes and food 
designs.  In practice, we find that there is uneven protection for food as 
well as important limitations on that protection.   
A. Trade Secrets 
 Trade secret protection promotes the diffusion of knowledge, 
economic development, and the maintenance of standards of commercial 
ethics.6  A trade secret is business information with actual or potential 
 
miso.  See Beth Kracklauer, 9 Signature Dishes, SAVEUR (Mar. 10, 2009), 
https://www.saveur.com/article/Kitchen/9-Signature-Dishes. 
6 See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–93 (1974). 




economic value and is subject to reasonable measures to maintain its 
secrecy.7  As long as the information is not generally known to the public, 
has a potential economic benefit or competitive advantage to the business, 
and is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy, trade secret 
protection can last indefinitely.8  There is no registration or examination 
process required.9  Trade secrets encompass technical and financial data, 
recipes, chemical formulas, compilations of data, computer programs, 
devices, methods and systems, techniques, processes, and lists of actual or 
potential customers or suppliers.10   
 The information must be sufficiently secret so that the owner 
derives actual or potential economic value because it is not generally 
known or readily ascertainable.11  Finally, to ensure that the information is 
not generally known or easily discovered, the owner must make reasonable 
efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information.12  Liability for trade 
secret misappropriation results when a person acquires another’s trade 
secret by improper means or uses or discloses it without the trade secret 
owner’s permission.13  Improper means include obtaining the trade secret 
by “bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement” to breach a duty to 
keep the information secret or industrial espionage.14  However, liability 
for misappropriation can be negated by proof of reverse engineering of a 
lawfully acquired product containing the trade secret,15 “or through [the] 
independent discovery of the same information constituting the trade 
secret.”16   
 As to food design—the shape and appearance of food—trade 
secret protection is unlikely to be available.  Food design presents a 
formidable challenge to trade secret protection: once the food is displayed 
and distributed to consumers, its design is no longer secret.17  However, 
under trade secret law, certain recipes, formulas, and manufacturing and 
 
7 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) 
[hereinafter UTSA]. 
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995) 
[hereinafter Restatement]. 
9 See Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The Intersection of Patents and Trade 
Secrets, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 189, 191 (2015). 
10 See Restatement § 39 cmt. d.  In addition, a trade secret can be “negative” 
information or know-how that results from research blind alleys, failed designs, 
and methods that do not work.  Id. at cmt. e.  The information need not be novel, 
in continuous use, or exist in a tangible form to be protected.  Id. at cmt. f. 
11 UTSA § 1(4)(i). 
12 Id. § 1(4)(ii).   
13 Id. § 1(2). 
14 Id. § 1(1). 
15 “Reverse engineering is the process by which an engineer takes an already 
existing product and works backward to re-create its design and/or manufacturing 
process.”  United Techs. Corp. v. FAA, 102 F.3d 688, 690 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996). 
16 See Kurt M. Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill or Secret? — The Line Between 
Trade Secrets and Employee General Skill and Knowledge, 15 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
BUS. 61, 75 (2018). 
17 Of course, the process or procedure for creating the food design could be a trade 
secret if it was maintained in secrecy and not readily ascertainable by others in 
the industry.  See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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preparation processes may be protected.  Some of the more well-known 
protected formulas and recipes are the original recipe for Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, the recipes for Twinkies and Krispy Kreme donuts, and, for a 
time, McDonald’s special sauce.18 When recipes have not qualified for 
trade secret protection, an often-cited reason is their lack of economic 
value in the trade secret sense.  Basic cooking and food preparation 
methods and concepts are ineligible for trade secret protection because 
they are already known or too easily discoverable to derive value from 
secrecy.  In Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke,19 for instance, the court held that the 
plaintiff could not claim trade secret protection for recipes for buffet 
cuisine, such as barbecued chicken and macaroni and cheese, because they 
were American staples and generally known.20  By contrast, the court in 
Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan21 found that a carefully guarded 
recipe for nut meal infused chocolate chip cookies had economic value 
because the cookies had an original and distinctive flavor and had been a 
commercial success.22 
 Also critical to successfully maintaining a recipe as a trade secret 
is a requirement that the owner takes reasonable steps to maintain its 
secrecy.  Here, absolute secrecy is not required, and the reasonableness of 
the measures taken to maintain secrecy depends on the particular 
circumstances of the business, including the nature of the product or 
service, the state of the art in the trade or industry, and the level of risk of 
disclosure.23  For instance, many chefs rely on nondisclosure agreements 
to preserve the secrecy of their recipes.24  The case of Magistro v. J. Lou, 
Inc.25 involved recipes for pizza dough and tomato sauce used in a family 
restaurant business.  Only family members created and prepared the 
recipes and no one outside the family knew the recipes.  The owners 
protected the family recipes by putting the ingredients into packets that 
were sealed and refrigerated until needed, and an employee would add 
water to make the sauce and the dough.26  Based on these efforts, the court 
concluded that the recipes derived independent economic value from not 
 
18 See Babak Zarin, Knead to Know: Cracking Recipes and Trade Secret Law, 8 
ELON L. REV. 183, 192 (2016). 
19 73 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1996). 
20 See id. at 968–69.  See also Li v. Shuman, No. 5:14-cv-00030, 2016 WL 
7217855, at *20 (W.D. Va. 2016) (holding that recipes for common Asian dishes 
are generally known); Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Sioux Falls Pizza Co., No. 
CIV. 12-4111-KES, 2012 WL 3190788, at *3 (D.S.D. 2012) (holding that systems 
for making ready-to-pick-up pizzas are generally known and lack economic 
value); Vraiment Hosp., LLC v. Binkowski, No. 8:11–CV–1240–T–33TGW, 
2021 WL 1493737, at *14 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that a recipe for salted 
caramel brownies is not secret because it can be found on the internet). 
21 466 N.E.2d 138 (Mass. Ct. App. 1984). 
22 See id. at 140. 
23 See Saunders & Golden, supra note 16, at 73. 
24 See Emily Cunningham, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric of Intellectual 
Property Law: Should the Law Play a Bigger Role in the Kitchen, 9 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 21, 49–50 (2009). 
25 703 N.W.2d 887 (Neb. 2005). 
26 See id. at 890–91. 




being known to other persons and that the owners made reasonable efforts 
under the circumstances to maintain their secrecy.27 
 Even when one can establish that a recipe is a trade secret, a claim 
of misappropriation depends on proof that the defendant either acquired 
the recipe through improper means or used or disclosed it without 
consent.28  In Magistro, even though the court agreed that recipes were 
protectable trade secrets, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendant 
was using their trade secrets, so their claim failed.29  By contrast, in Bimbo 
Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella,30 the owner of the recipe for Thomas’ 
English Muffins, including the secret behind the muffins’ unique “nooks 
and crannies” texture, prevailed in obtaining a preliminary injunction 
based on threatened misappropriation against a former senior executive 
who had accepted a similar position working for a competitor.31  
According to the court in Botticella, there was sufficient evidence that the 
former employee intended to use the trade secret because he had not 
disclosed his acceptance of a job offer from a direct competitor, remained 
in a position to receive confidential information after committing to the 
other job, and copied trade secret information from his work laptop onto 
external storage devices.32 
 As these cases demonstrate, it is imperative that a recipe is not 
merely kept confidential, but that its value is derived from its uniqueness 
within the industry.  Finally, owners of trade secrets in recipes must 
remember that they are not protected from reverse engineering of the 
recipes by others, nor can they assert their trade secret rights against others 
who independently develop the same or similar recipes.  A claim for relief 
must be based on evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation of the 
trade secret at issue.33  Nevertheless, due to its potentially unlimited 
duration and informality by which it can be established, trade secrecy 
remains an attractive form of protection for recipes.34 
 
27 Id. at 891. 
28 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
29 See Magistro, 703 N.W.2d at 892. 
30 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010). 
31 Id. at 119. 
32 Id. at 118.  See also Revzip, LLC v. McDonnell, No. 3:19-cv-191, 2020 WL 
1929523, at *8–9 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (requiring employees to sign confidentiality 
agreements, disclosing the recipes for sandwich dressing only on a need-to-know 
basis, and protecting the recipes with electronic security were reasonable secrecy 
measures); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 
1996) (injunction against former employee to protect bagel air tight packaging 
process); Christopher M’s Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (injunction against former employee to protect secret recipe 
and manufacturing process). 
33 See UTSA §§ 2, 3. 
34 For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of trade secret protection for 
recipes, see Babak, supra note 18. 
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B. Copyrights 
 Copyright protection affords “a set of exclusive rights granted to 
authors as to the ownership and use of their creative works.”35  The work 
of authorship must be original and fixed in a tangible medium to qualify 
for protection, like being recorded or preserved in some steady, physical 
form.36  The Copyright Act provides that the fixation requirement has been 
met “when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit 
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration.”37  Originality requires that the work’s 
origin is the author, who has not copied it from another source.38  
Moreover, the work must demonstrate “some minimal degree of 
creativity.”39   
 According to the Copyright Act, copyright protection extends 
only to the original and fixed expression embodied in works of authorship, 
including (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works; (7) sound 
recordings; and (8) architectural designs.40  Computer software can be 
protected as well.41  A compilation of facts or data is protected to the extent 
that there is originality in selecting, coordinating, or arranging the 
elements.42  However, ideas, discoveries, principles, methods, procedures, 
and useful articles are not eligible for copyright protection.43  Only 
expression is protected, but the merger doctrine dictates that the expression 
is uncopyrightable when there is only one way to express the idea or fact.44 
 Copyright protection for a work of authorship vests the moment 
an original work is fixed, regardless of whether it is ever published.  
Although not required, the copyright owner may register the copyright 
 
35 KURT M. SAUNDERS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 259 (2016). 
36 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  A work is “fixed” when embodied 
in a copy or phonorecord, both of which are defined in the Copyright Act as a 
material object.  See id. § 101.  The embodied work must be stable rather than 
temporary or transient to be fixed.  See, e.g., Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 
290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasoning “that a living garden lacks the kind of 
authorship and stable fixation normally required to support copyright”); Stern 
Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that a video 
game satisfies fixation because of “[t]he repetitive sequence of a substantial 
portion of the sights and sounds of the game”). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
38 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
39 Id. 
40 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
41 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992). 
42 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
43 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990). 
44 See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 
1990) (holding that maps of pipeline locations are not copyrightable); Morrissey 
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that subject matter 
of contest rules is not copyrightable). 




with the U.S. Copyright Office.45  The term of copyright protection for 
most works is the author’s lifetime, plus seventy years.46  Copyright 
owners have the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, adapt their 
works to create derivative works, publicly distribute them, and publicly 
perform and display their works.47  In addition, the copyright owner may 
transfer by license or assignment any or all of these rights to another.48  
Any person who exercises any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights 
without authorization may be liable for copyright infringement.49 
 As applied to recipes, copyright law affords little protection.  At 
the risk of making cooking sound like a mechanical operation, courts have 
viewed recipes as processes or procedures for creating or assembling a 
particular dish.  As section 102(b) provides, “[i]n no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any . . . procedure 
[or] process . . . .”50  In other words, most recipes do not constitute original 
expression.  The court in Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith 
Corp.51 explained that “the content of recipes are clearly dictated by 
functional considerations, and . . . lack the required element of 
originality.”52  That case involved a cookbook compilation of recipes made 
with yogurt, which the court viewed as functional lists of ingredients and 
directions on how to combine them.53  Similarly, in Lambing v. Godiva 
Chocolatier,54 the court held that a recipe for a chocolate truffle was not 
copyrightable since it was a mere statement of facts and lacking in any 
expressive content.55  One might view the lack of originality in recipes as 
a merger of idea, fact, and expression since the nature of the dish dictates 
the listing of ingredients and the directions for preparation.56  As the court 
in Sassafras Enterprises, Inc. v. Roshco, Inc.57 explained, recipes are 
ineligible for copyright protection because they “dictate themselves and 
flow from the characteristics and intended use of the product, not from the 
imagination of any independent author.”58 
 
45 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2005).  Registration creates a presumption of ownership of 
a valid copyright.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976), reprinted in 17 
U.S.C. § 410 (1976). 
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998). 
47 See id. § 106 (2002). 
48 See id. § 201(d) (1978). 
49 See id. § 501(a) (2019). 
50 Id. § 102(b) (1990) (internal punctuation omitted). 
51 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
52 Id. at 481 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.18[l], at 2-204.25 to .26 (May 1996)).  Accord Harrell v. St. John, 
792 F. Supp. 2d 933 (S.D. Miss. 2011). 
53 Publ’ns Int’l, 88 F.3d at 480. 
54 142 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 1998). 
55 Id. at 434. 
56 See Lorenzana v. S. Am. Rests. Corp., 799 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding 
that a recipe as a combination of ingredients for making a sandwich not 
copyrightable); Lapine v. Seinfeld, 375 Fed. Appx. 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the underlying idea of recipes containing vegetable purees for hidden use in 
children’s food is not copyrightable). 
57 889 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
58 Id. at 347. 
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 On the other hand, recipes containing other original expression, 
such as commentary or artistic elements, could qualify for protection.  In 
Barbour v. Head,59 for instance, the court distinguished between rote 
recitations of ingredients and instructions to find copyrightable expression 
in the “light-hearted or helpful commentary” that accompanied the recipes 
in a Texas-themed cookbook.60  This echoes the court’s statement in 
Publications International that recipes warranting protection may be those 
where the recipe includes expressive content such as “suggestions for 
presentation, advice on wines to go with the meal, or hints on place settings 
with appropriate music,” or where the recipes are accompanied by “tales 
of their historical or ethnic origin.”61  Other courts have found similar 
expression warranting protection to include the use of pictures and 
illustrations, quotations and poems, handwritten script, and similar artistic 
and graphic elements.62  Nevertheless, others would be free to explain or 
illustrate a recipe using dissimilar expressions. 
 Although most recipes themselves may garner no copyright 
protection, a compilation of recipes may be protected if their selection, 
coordination, and arrangement are original.63  For instance, in Tomaydo-
Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary,64 the plaintiffs asserted copyright protection 
for a book of recipes for family-friendly foods based on its restaurant 
menu.  After observing that the recipes themselves did not merit copyright 
protection because they were factual statements and functional directions, 
the court reasoned that protection might extend to a book of recipes to the 
degree that the compilation demonstrates originality in selecting or 
arranging of the recipes.65  However, the court found that the compilation 
of family-friendly recipes was not original because the plaintiffs never 
identified what was original and creative in the process of selecting and 
arranging them.66 
 Courts have noted that food and specifically food designs, are 
typically ineligible for copyright protection because they do not satisfy the 
Copyright Act’s requirement that the work be fixed in a tangible 
medium.67  In Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc.,68 the plaintiff claimed 
 
59 178 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
60 Id. at 764. 
61 Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996). 
62 See, e.g., Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., No. 89 CIV. 2440 LLS, 1990 WL 
74540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
63 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “compilation” as “a work formed 
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are 
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole 
constitutes an original work of authorship.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
64 629 F. App’x. 658 (6th Cir. 2015). 
65 Id. at 661. 
66 Id.  One court has found that the lack of originality problem can extend to 
photographs of cooked food dishes as well.  See Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. 
Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that 
photos of common Chinese dishes as they appear on plates served to customers 
were insufficiently original for copyright protection). 
67 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
68 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 




copyright protection for a food sculpture of a traditional Vietnamese 
dish.69  The court, however, found that the sculpture failed to satisfy the 
fixation requirement of the Copyright Act.70  Relying on Kelley v. Chicago 
Park District,71 the court found that a bowl of perishable food similarly 
did not satisfy the fixation requirement because it was not sufficiently 
stable or permanent.72   
 Furthermore, the court in Kim Seng reasoned that the combination 
of unprotectable elements in a display of traditional Vietnamese cuisine 
lacked originality and were inseparable from their underlying utilitarian 
purpose, which is to be consumed.73  This issue is directly related to 
copyright protection of the design of any three-dimensional work of useful 
or applied art.  Copyright protection extends to applied art “only if, and 
only to the extent that, such design incorporates . . . sculptural features that 
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”74  As such, any 
artistic or aesthetic elements of a dish would have to be identified 
separately from the food and exist independent of the utilitarian purpose 
of consuming the food.  It is difficult to imagine that many food sculptures 
or designs could meet this requirement unless they were created for the 
purpose of not being eaten.75 
 In sum, the limitations and restrictions of copyright law make it 
an impractical fit for recipes and food designs.  Basic recipes alone are not 
copyrightable unless the recipes contain a sufficient number of other 
original expressions beyond and unrelated to the listing of ingredients and 
the procedure for combining them.  Likewise, recipes are also 
unprotectable unless protection is sought for a compilation of recipes that 
reflect a requisite measure of originality in selecting and arranging those 
recipes.76  As for food displays, designs, and sculptures, the primary 
 
69 Id. at 1051. 
70 Id. at 1054. 
71 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an artistically arranged living 
garden was not stable or permanent enough to be a work of fixed authorship). 
72 Kim Seng Co., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.  For the same reason, tattoos and facial 
make-up designs are not fixed on human skin, although courts have ruled that 
such works can be fixed if recorded on paper or in photographs.  See Mourabit v. 
Klein, 816 F. Appx. 574 (2d Cir. 2020) (make-up artistry); Solid Oak Sketches, 
LLC v. 2K Games, Inc., No. 16-CV-724-LTS-SDA, 2018 WL 1626145 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (tattoos).  However, infringement would be difficult to prove if the tattoo 
or make-up appeared on a person’s skin since it would not itself be a copy.  See 
Saunders, supra note 35, at 270 (“The unauthorized copy must be fixed in a 
material object . . . .”). 
73 Kim Seng Co., 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.   
74 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
75 More than one commentator has proposed expanding the Copyright Act’s 
protection for moral rights in works of visual art to encompass protection for 
“food art.”  See Caroline M. Reebs, Extending Copyright Protection to Food Art, 
22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41 (2011); Cathay Y. Smith, Food 
Art: Protecting “Food Presentation” Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 14 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2014). 
76 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.   
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roadblock to protection is that they cannot meet the fixation requirement77 
for copyrightability and suffer from the secondary barrier of being 
ultimately inseparable from their underlying utilitarian purpose as edible 
food.78  
C. Utility and Design Patents 
 A patent is a right granted by the United States, which allows an 
inventor to exclude others from practicing the invention during the patent 
term.79 In other words, patents protect inventions.80    The purpose of patent 
law is to promote the progress of the useful arts by disclosing inventions 
in exchange for a limited term of protection.81  The two main types of 
patents are utility patents and design patents.   
1. Utility Patent Protection 
 A utility patent can be granted on a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”82  A recipe typically describes a list of ingredients, instructions 
on combining and cooking them, and the resulting food product or dish.  
Since a recipe consists of a list of ingredients and instructions, a recipe can 
be considered a process and a food product or dish as a composition of 
matter or a manufacture.  To obtain a patent, a party must apply to the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, where it is subject to a detailed examination 
process to determine whether the claimed invention satisfies the 
requirements for patentability.83  If granted, the term of protection for a 
utility patent is twenty years from the date the application was filed.84  A 
patent owner has the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
or offering to sell, and importing the invention in the United States.85   
 An invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious to qualify for 
patent protection.86  An invention is useful only if it has a practical 
application or serves a specific benefit.87  In the case of recipes or food 
products, the utility requirement would be met if the invention is a process 
for preparing edible food or if the product itself was an article or 
combination of ingredients that could be consumed.88  Novelty is 
demonstrated if the claimed invention has never before been publicly 
disclosed through use, sale, patenting, or publication anywhere in the 
 
77 See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
78 See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
79 See Saunders, supra note 35, at 97. 
80 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (providing that inventors may obtain patents).   
81 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
82 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
83 For an explanation of the patent application and examination process, see AMY 
L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 19–56 (2d ed. 2012). 
84 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
85 Id. § 271(a). 
86 Id. §§ 101, 102(a), 103. 
87 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966). 
88 See Morgan P. Arons, A Chef’s Guide to Patent Protections Available for 
Cooking Techniques and Recipes in the Era of Postmodern Cuisine and 
Molecular Gastronomy, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 137, 141 (2015). 




world before the date on which the patent application was filed.89  There 
is an exception if the inventor has publicly disclosed the invention, as long 
as the inventor files an application within one year after the date of the 
disclosure.90 
 Novelty is a technical and precise requirement.  To disqualify a 
patent application for lack of novelty, the preceding disclosure must 
involve a single prior art source or reference that disclosed an identical 
invention to that claimed in the application.91  The prior disclosure must 
be enabling, so that those who are knowledgeable in the field can 
understand it,92 and it must be publicly accessible so as to be located.93  In 
the context of food, this means that the recipe or food product must be new 
in the sense that it represents a previously unknown combination of 
ingredients or variation on a known recipe.94  In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. 
Nabisco Brands,95 Proctor & Gamble had secured a patent for a recipe and 
process for making a dual-textured cookie—crispy on the outside and 
chewy on the inside—by baking and tempering the laminated dough 
structure.96  When the defendants began marketing their own dual-textured 
cookies, Proctor & Gamble sued for infringement, and the defendants 
argued that the patent was invalid and unenforceable based on a cookie 
recipe published in an earlier cookbook.  After examining each element of 
the claimed invention, the court determined that the recipe and process 
were invalid as anticipated by the earlier recipe found in the printed 
publication.97 
 In addition to being novel, the invention must be nonobvious.  
Because novelty and nonobviousness are distinct requirements, even if a 
recipe or food product is novel, the recipe or food product could still be 
considered obvious and unpatentable.  An invention is nonobvious when 
those of ordinary skill in the field and familiar with the existing technology 
would not have easily conceived it.98  In other words, if the differences 
between the invention and prior art are such that make the invention 
obvious at the time it was made to persons with ordinary skill in the art, 
 
89 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). 
90 Id. § 102(b). 
91 See Saunders, supra note 35, at 124. 
92 Impax Lab’ys, Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“In order to be anticipating, a prior art reference must be enabling so that 
the claimed subject matter may be made or used by one skilled in the art.”). 
93 See Jazz Pharms., Inc. v. Amneal Pharms., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (“A reference is considered publicly accessible ‘upon a satisfactory 
showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available 
to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or 
art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” (quoting In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 
221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
94 See Arons, supra note 88, at 141. 
95 711 F. Supp. 759 (D. Del. 1989). 
96 Id. at 760. 
97 Id. at 773. 
98 See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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then it is not patentable.99  Thus, the key to assessing nonobviousness is to 
compare the invention as a whole with the references in the prior art.100  If 
an objective person skilled in the art would have found the claimed 
invention to be an obvious next step beyond the current field of 
technology, then the invention is obvious.101  If the combination, 
preparation, or variations of known ingredients leads to expected results 
or flavors because the ingredients react in well-understood ways, the 
product is likely to be considered obvious to a person having ordinary 
culinary arts skills.102   
 The utility patent at issue in Ex parte Kretchman103 illustrates 
these points.  An invention relating to a crustless peanut butter and jelly 
sandwich was the issue at the heart of Kretchman.104  The patent 
application described an arrangement of the jelly layer in the center so that 
it is surrounded by the peanut butter layers and crimped at the edges to 
prevent the jelly from leaking out.105  When the patent examiner rejected 
the application because the patent was invalid due to obviousness, 
Smucker appealed.106  The prior art references included a book of recipes 
describing a device for creating a crustless sandwich.107  Another prior art 
reference was a newspaper article that recommended applying peanut 
butter to both pieces of bread before the jelly to prevent the bread from 
becoming soggy.108  Based on these references, the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences109 ruled that the patent was invalid because 
those of ordinary skill in the field would consider the Smucker invention 
obvious.110 
 
99 Unlike lack of novelty due to any single source of prior art that discloses the 
same invention, a finding of obviousness may be based on a combination of prior 
art sources that deal with the same problem or together suggest the same solution 
to the problem.  See In re Nylen, 97 Fed. Appx. 293 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Clay, 
966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
100 See Landers, supra note 83, at 365. 
101 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007); Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
102 See Arons, supra note 88, at 145. 
103 No. 2003-1754, 2003 WL 23507730 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 10, 2003). 
104 Id. at *1.   
105 Id. at *2. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at *2–3. 
108 Id.  
109 This board is now known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.  It conducts 
trials, including inter partes, post-grant, and covered business method patent 
reviews and derivation proceedings.  It also hears appeals from adverse examiner 
decisions in patent applications and reexamination proceedings, and renders 
decisions in interferences.  See generally Patent Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab (last visited Apr. 
2, 2021). 
110 See Kretchman, at *6–7.  Specifically, the Board explained that based on the 
two prior art references, “one of ordinary skill in the art . . . would [understand] . 
. . that the peanut butter should be applied in a manner so as to encapsulate the 
jelly, that is, the jelly layer would be made smaller in area so that it does not 
contact the bread.”  Id. at *7. 




 Despite the apparent difficulties in securing utility patents, utility 
patents have been granted for recipes and food products.  Examples 
include: a recipe for instant stuffing mix,111 a method for making a 
microwaveable sponge cake,112 burrito on a stick,113 cereal coated with dry 
milk,114 a process for making fruit ganache,115 yogurt cream cheese,116 
microwaveable sponge cake,117 sugarless baked goods,118 an egg 
substitute,119 processes for making fried baked potato pieces,120 low-fat 
potato chips,121 frozen popsicles,122 and battered foods.123  While it is often 
difficult to meet the requirements for obtaining a utility patent, it offers 
one of the most robust forms of intellectual property protection allowing 
the patentee to exclude all others from using the recipe, or making, selling, 
or importing the food product.124  However, it must be kept in mind that 
the length of protection is finite—expiring after twenty years—thus 
allowing the recipes or food product to become part of the public domain 
at that time.125 
2. Design Patent Protection 
 While utility patents protect how an article works and is used, 
design patents protect how an article looks.  A design patent protects new, 
original, and ornamental designs for articles of manufacture.126  An article 
of manufacture is a product that results from a manufacturing process.127  
The design consists of the visual ornamental characteristics embodied in 
or applied to an article of manufacture.128  Design patents have been issued 
for a broad assortment of products—including furniture, tools, 
automobiles, water fountains, vending machines, microwave ovens, tire 
 
111 U.S. Patent No. 3,870,803 (filed Jul. 7, 1971). 
112 U.S. Patent No. 6,410,074B1 (filed Oct. 4, 2000). 
113 U.S. Patent No. 4,399,156 (filed Jan. 25, 1982). 
114 U.S. Patent No. 6,051,262 (filed July 27, 1998). 
115 U.S. Patent No. 5,958,503 (filed Feb. 21, 1997). 
116 U.S. Patent No. 7,258,886 (filed Mar. 18, 2005). 
117 U.S. Patent No. 6,410,074 (filed Feb. 9, 2001). 
118 U.S. Patent No. 5,700,511A (filed Mar. 1, 1996). 
119 U.S. Patent No. 4,120,986 (filed June 28, 1977). 
120 U.S. Patent No. 8,329,244 (filed July 15, 2011). 
121 U.S. Patent No. 8,163,321 (filed Oct. 31, 2007). 
122 Popsicle Corp. v. Weiss, 40 F.2d 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). 
123 U.S. Patent No. 6,117,463 (filed Nov. 25, 1998). 
124 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
126 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
127 See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016) (observing 
that “[a]n article of manufacture, then, is simply a thing made by hand or 
machine”). 
128 See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1502 (9th ed. Rev. 
10.2019, June 2020) [hereinafter MPEP] (reviewing case law that defines the 
subject matter of design patents). 
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tread, and computer screen icons.129  The term of a design patent is limited 
to 15 years from the date the patent is granted.130   
 As to the requirements for design patent protection, originality 
requires that the design originate with the applicant.131  A design is novel 
if no prior art reference publicly discloses the identical design before the 
application was filed.132  In addition, the design must be nonobvious.  A 
design is nonobvious if a designer of ordinary skill who designs articles of 
the same type would consider differences in the visual appearance of the 
design and those from the prior art not to be obvious.133  Furthermore, the 
design must be ornamental and nonfunctional.134  If its function dictated 
the entire appearance of the article, then the design is not ornamental.135  
If a particular design is essential to the use of an article because it is 
dictated by the use or purpose of the article or enhances the article’s 
performance, then the design is functional.136   
 
129 E.g., U.S. Patent No. D485,709 (filed Apr. 16, 2003) (furniture); U.S. Patent 
No. D772,671 (filed June 24, 2015) (hammer); U.S. Patent No. D732,431 (filed 
Aug. 15, 2014) (motor car); Application of Hruby, 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967) 
(water fountain); Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, Ltd., 157 F.3d 
1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (vending machine); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 
728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (microwave oven); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (tire tread); U.S. 
Patent No. D668,263 (filed Oct. 8, 2010) (computer icon). 
130 35 U.S.C. § 173.  Design patents usually contain a single claim comprised of 
a drawing, unlike a utility patent, which contains multiple textual claims.  Design 
patent claims are limited to what is shown in the application drawings.  See MPEP 
§ 1503.02.  As with utility patents, a design patent must disclose the claimed 
design with definiteness as assessed by an ordinary observer.  See In re Maatita, 
900 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
131 See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the originality requirement for design patents, like that 
for copyright, requires that the design have originated with the creator). 
132 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).  However, such a disclosure will not be treated as prior art 
if the design was publicly disclosed by the applicant one year or less before filing 
a patent application.  Id. § 102(b). 
133 See Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  In 
determining nonobviousness, the patent examiner considers whether a prior art 
reference or a combination of references shares design characteristics that are 
basically the same as the visual impression created by the claimed design.  If a 
designer of ordinary skill would be likely to believe this, then the claimed design 
is obvious and not patentable.  See MPEP § 1504.03. 
134 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
135 See Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (noting that the analysis of ornamentality is holistic, focusing on the overall 
appearance of the claimed design rather than the appearance of the article itself).  
Courts may consider the availability of alternative designs for the article as an 
important and persuasive factor in evaluating the functionality of a claimed 
design.  Id. 
136 See Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Auto. 
Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Global Techs., LLC, 930 F.3d 1314, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 
2019) (explaining that “Best Lock turned on the admitted fact that no alternatively 
designed blade would mechanically operate the lock—not that the blade and lock 
were aesthetically compatible”).  Of course, since some articles of manufacture 




 A number of food designs have been granted design patents: 
dinosaur-shaped crackers,137 a cheesecake with embedded swirl,138 a 
teddy-bear-shaped sugar confection,139 stuffed pizza pockets,140 a deep 
dish pizza slice,141 heart-shaped candy canes,142 waffles,143 chocolate 
bars,144 and embossed bread,145 among others.  In addition, many patented 
designs apply to well-known branded products, including: Mars Candy 
bars,146 Breyer’s Viennetta frozen desserts,147 Wrigley’s Eclipse gum,148 
Coldstone Creamery’s Strawberry Passion ice cream cake,149 Morton salt 
blocks,150 numerous Kraft pastas,151 and Frito Lay snack food products.152 
 As with utility patents, a design patent confers the right to exclude 
others from making, using, selling, importing, and offering to sell certain 
products bearing the same or substantially similar appearance to the 
patented design.153  Proving infringement of a design patent requires that 
the accused design be identical or substantially the same as the patented 
design.154  This determination is made from the standpoint of the ordinary 
observer.155  Under this test, infringement occurs when—in the view of an 
ordinary observer familiar with prior art design—the similarities are 
substantially the same so that the ordinary observer would believe that the 
allegedly infringing design is the same as the overall patented design.156  
 
may possess both functional and ornamental characteristics, they may be 
protected by both utility and design patents. 
137 U.S. Patent No. D782,777 (filed May 9, 2016). 
138 U.S. Patent No. D762,342 (filed Dec. 18. 2014). 
139 U.S. Patent No. D788,400 (filed Jun. 30, 2016). 
140 U.S. Patent No. D784,650 (filed Mar. 19, 2015). 
141 U.S. Patent No. D783,225 (filed Apr. 9, 2015). 
142 U.S. Patent No. D785,900 (filed Sep. 24, 2009). 
143 U.S. Patent No. D373,452 (filed Sep. 20, 1995). 
144 U.S. Patent No. D788,401 (filed Nov. 5, 2012). 
145 U.S. Patent No. D790,154 (filed Jan. 14, 2016). 
146 U.S. Patent No. D593,276 (filed Jul. 10, 2008). 
147 U.S. Patent No. D486,951 (filed Nov. 18, 2002). 
148 U.S. Patent No. D539,007 (filed Sep. 5, 2003). 
149 U.S. Patent No. D571,526 (filed Jun. 23, 2004). 
150 U.S. Patent No. D848,107 (filed Apr. 11, 2017). 
151 E.g., U.S. Patent No. D525,411 (filed May 31, 2005) (map of United States); 
U.S. Patent No. D517,772 (filed May 31, 2005) (dinosaur shape); U.S. Patent No. 
D515,272 (filed Aug. 28. 2003) (magic wand shape). 
152 E.g., U.S. Patent No. D789,027S (issued Jun. 13, 2017); U.S. Patent No. 
D787,152S (issued May 23, 2017); U.S. Patent No. D787,151S (issued May 23, 
2017); U.S. Patent No. D786,526S (issued May 16, 2017); U.S. Patent No. 
D785,280S (issued May 2, 2017); U.S. Patent No. D785,278S (issued May 2, 
2017); U.S. Patent No. D783,928S (issued Apr. 18, 2017); U.S. Patent No. 
D779,777S (issued Feb. 28, 2017). 
153 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
154 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). 
155 The ordinary observer is the person who regularly purchases such items.  See 
Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007); Arc’Teryx Equip., Inc. v. Westcomb Outerwear, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-
59 TS, 2008 WL 4838141, at *2 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 2008). 
156 See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528 (observing that infringement occurs only if the 
ordinary observer would mistake one product for the other).  An “ordinary 
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The focus is on similarities with the overall patented design, not on 
similarities of individual elements. 
 In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,157 the court applied the 
ordinary observer test.  Egyptian Goddess owned a design patent on a 
rectangular, hollow nail buffer.158  Egyptian Goddess sued Swisa Inc., 
alleging that a Swisa fingernail buffer infringed the patent.159  Swisa 
moved for a summary judgment of noninfringement.160  The district court 
granted Swisa’s motion and Egyptian Goddess appealed.161  The Federal 
Circuit held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment of 
noninfringement.162  According to the court, under the ordinary observer 
test, infringement will not be found unless the accused design “embodies 
the patented design or any colorable imitation thereof.”163  The allegedly 
infringing Swisa design could not reasonably be viewed as so similar to 
the claimed Egyptian Goddess design that an ordinary observer familiar 
with the prior art would be deceived by the similarity between the claimed 
and accused designs.164   
 Design patent infringement cases involving food-related products 
are rare, but Contessa Food Products, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc.,165 provides 
one example.  The owner of a design patent for shrimp serving trays 
brought an action against a competitor selling allegedly infringing trays.166  
The patent covered a circular serving tray with a center receptacle for 
cocktail sauce to facilitate a circular arrangement of concentric rows of 
shrimp aligned together in a mound.167  The defendant sold a similar 
shrimp platter.168  In applying the ordinary observer test, the court of 
appeals held that the “ordinary observer” analysis is not limited to those 
features visible at the point of sale, but instead must encompass all 
ornamental features visible at any time during normal use of the product.169  
As such, the district court had erred in failing to consider the underside of 
the serving tray as well as the visible portion to assess substantial 
 
observer” is “someone who—while not an expert in the product—is not entirely 
ignorant of it, and indeed has some degree of familiarity with it. The ‘ordinary 
observer’ thus includes someone who has purchased, or shopped for, a like item 
in the past.”  Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 7211 PGG, 
2012 WL 3031150, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2012). 
157 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
158 Id. at 668. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 669. 
162 Id. at 670. 
163 Id. at 678. 
164 Id. at 682–83.  Note also that the defense of patent exhaustion and the related 
repair and reconstruction doctrine apply to design patents.  See Automotive Body 
Parts Ass’n v. Ford Global Techs., LLC, 930 F.3d 1314, 1322–25 (Fed. Cir. 
2019). 
165 282 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
166 Id. at 1376. 
167 U.S. Patent No. D404,612 (issued Jan. 26, 1999). 
168 Contessa Food Prods., 282 F.3d at 1375. 
169 Id. at 1379–81. 




similarity.170  The importance of focusing on the overall ornamental 
appearance, particularly with simple and inexpensive designs, was 
underscored in a subsequent infringement case involving garlic and onion 
storage containers.171 
D. Trademarks and Trade Dress 
Trademarks identify and distinguish the source of goods or 
services,172 and generally take the form of a word, phrase, symbol, design, 
or some combination of these.173  Trademarks can also be scents, sounds, 
and colors.174  Trade dress is a type of trademark that refers to the overall 
appearance of a product or its packaging.175  Trade dress consists of “the 
total image and overall appearance” of a product and “may include 
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, textures, 
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”176 
Trademark rights are intended to protect against potential 
consumer confusion as to the source of a particular product,177 and may be 
protected under state common law of unfair competition, state trademark 
statutes,178 and the federal Lanham Act.179  To obtain trademark protection, 
 
170 Id. at 1381.  
171 See Hutzler Mfg. Co., 2012 WL 3031150, at *14–15.  Another case involved 
an infringement claim based on a design patent for a peace sign-shaped pretzel.  
See U.S. Patent No. D423184 (issued Apr. 25, 2000).  The plaintiff alleged that 
the defendants were selling similarly shaped pretzel chips, but the case eventually 
settled.  See Complaint at 3–4, Friend v. Keystone Pretzels, No. 2:13-cv-01028-
DSC (W.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 2013), 2013 WL3878103. 
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); see also Restatement § 9 (1995) (“A trademark 
is a word . . . that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and 
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.”). 
173 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(3), 1127. 
174 Scents that have been trademarked include floral fragrances for sewing thread, 
In re Clark, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990), and Play-Doh scent (U.S. Reg. 
No. 5,467,089, May 15, 2018).  Trademarked sounds include the NBC chimes 
(U.S. Reg. No. 916,522, Jul. 13, 1971), MGM’s roaring lion (U.S. Reg. No. 
1,395,550, Jun. 3, 1986), and the Tarzan yell (U.S. Reg. No. 2,210,506, Dec. 15, 
1998).  In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995), the 
Supreme Court held that a color (in this case green gold dry cleaning pads) could 
be trademarked as long as it had acquired secondary meaning.  Tiffany blue is 
also a registered trademark (U.S. Registration No. 2,359,351, June 20, 2000). 
175 See Saunders, supra note 35, at 534. 
176 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992). 
177 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (recognizing a cause of action for the use by any person 
of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . 
which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval 
of his or her goods . . . .”). 
178 For an overview and discussion of the role of state trademark law, see John T. 
Cross, The Role of the States in United States Trademark Law, 49 U. LOUISVILLE 
L. REV. 485 (2011). 
179 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128. The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 out of concern 
that leaving trademark protection to the states would create inconsistency and 
uncertainty in the law and in order to provide national protection for trademarks 
used in interstate and foreign commerce.  S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 
5 (1946). 
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users must be the first to use it in trade and must use it continuously 
thereafter.180  The Lanham Act permits the owner of a trademark to 
federally register the mark if it is (1) distinctive and (2) used in interstate 
or international commerce.181  Federal registration lasts for ten years and 
may be renewed for additional ten-year periods as long as the mark 
remains in commercial use.182  While federal registration provides a 
trademark owner with additional protections and remedies,183 an 
unregistered trademark is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act if it 
satisfies the requirements for federal registration.184 
1. Protectable Trademarks and Trade Dress 
 Different types of marks—inherently distinctive marks, 
descriptive marks, and generic marks—receive different levels of 
protection.  A mark that is considered inherently distinctive receives the 
most protection.185  Inherently distinctive marks can be fanciful, arbitrary, 
or suggestive.186  A fanciful mark is one consisting of a made-up word or 
a combination of letters and numbers with no known meaning.187  
 
180 If two parties use the same distinctive mark, the first to use the mark, known 
as the senior user, will have priority in the mark.  The exception is if the second 
party to use the mark establishes a strong consumer identification with the mark 
in a geographic area separate from the senior user’s area, in which case the second 
party will have priority in that separate geographic area.  See Dawn Donut Co. v. 
Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959). 
181 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1127. 
182 Id. §§ 1058–1059. 
183 Placement on the federal trademark register gives the trademark owner several 
advantages.  Among other things: (1) it gives constructive notice of the user’s 
claim to the mark; (2) it provides prima facia evidence of ownership; (3) it permits 
the owner to sue in federal rather than state court, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (4) the right 
to use the mark becomes virtually incontestable after five years, id. § 1065; and 
(5) it allows the owner to obtain rights in a larger geographic area than allowed 
under common law.  Id. § 1115(a).  See also U.S.P.T.O. v. Booking.com B.V., 
140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).  If a mark is 
not placed on the Principal Register because it is descriptive and not distinctive, 
it may be placed on the Supplemental Register if it has potential to become 
distinctive.  Placement on the Supplemental Register confers few benefits; 
however, it allows the owner to display the registered symbol, which may 
discourage infringers.  It may also help establish secondary meaning.  See 
Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2302. 
18415 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 
768 (1992); Sugar Busters, LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1999); 
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 299 n.9 (3d Cir. 1986); Thompson 
Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc. 753 F.2d 208, 215–16 (2d Cir. 1985).  State laws may 
provide similar protections to registration on the Principal Register.  See, e.g., 
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. IJR Capital Invs., LLC, 891 F.3d 178, 184–85 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(applying Texas law). 
185 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
186 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210–11 (2000); 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10–11. 
187 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12. 




Examples of fanciful marks would be Pepsi, Kodak, and Exxon.188 
Arbitrary marks are actual words with a known meaning that have no 
association to or relationship with the protected product.189  Examples 
would be Apple for computers and Blackberry for a personal digital 
assistant.  Suggestive marks are those that have no immediate association 
to the product but suggest its characteristics or qualities.190  For example, 
Speedi Bake, Noburst, Dri-Foot, Sno-Rake and Frankwurst have each 
been found to be suggestive marks.191 
 Marks that describe the qualities or characteristics of a product are 
called descriptive marks.192  Descriptive marks receive trademark 
protection only when they have acquired secondary meaning.193 
Secondary meaning arises when consumers have begun to associate the 
trademark with the source of the product rather than the product itself.194  
Finally, marks that describe the type or class of product itself are generic 
and are not registerable.195  Some examples of marks that have become 
generic and therefore have lost their trademark status include: aspirin, 
heroin, cellophane, escalator, trampoline, thermos, dry ice, kerosene, yo-
yo, and zipper.196 
 
188 See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (Oct. 
2018) [hereinafter TMEP]. 
189 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12. 
190 Id. at 10–11. 
191 See TMEP § 1209.01(a). 
192 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). 
193 Id.; see also Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc., 
799 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2015). 
194 Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982).  In 
determining whether secondary meaning exists, courts will weigh several factors, 
including: (1) association of the trademark with a particular source by actual 
purchasers, typically measured by customer surveys; (2) length, degree, and 
exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; (4) amount of sales and 
number of customers; (5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage 
of the product embodying the mark.  See Converse, Inc. v. ITC, 909 F.3d 1110 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
195 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), 1064(c); Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9.  In 
U.S.P.T.O. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020), the Supreme Court 
rejected the contention of the Patent and Trademark Office that the combination 
of a generic word and “.com” is generic.  “A ‘generic.com’ term might also 
convey to consumers a source-identifying characteristic: an association with a 
particular website.”  Id. at 2306.  A registered mark may be cancelled at any time 
on the ground that it has become generic.  15 U.S.C. §1064(3). 
196 See Mary Beth Quirk, 15 Product Trademarks That Have Become Victims of 
Genericization, CONSUMER REPS. (July 19, 2014), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/15-product-trademarks-that-have-
become-victims-of-genericization/.  In the context of food, the mark “pretzel 
crisps” has been held to be generic for a pretzel cracker snack.  See Princeton 
Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
For other examples of food marks held to be generic, see Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat), Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft 
Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (brick oven pizza), Weiss Noodle Co. v. 
Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (egg noodles), 
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   Trade dress similarly receives different levels of protection 
depending on whether the trade dress consists of product packaging or 
product design. Trade dress originally included only the packaging or 
“dressing” of a product,197 but subsequently was expanded to include the 
design of the product itself.198  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.199 
involved packaging in the form of restaurant design.  Taco Cabana’s 
claimed trade dress consisted of “a festive eating atmosphere having 
interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors, 
paintings and murals.”200  Subsequently, Two Pesos opened a Mexican 
restaurant with a motif similar to Taco Cabana’s, and Taco Cabana sued 
for trade dress infringement.201 The Supreme Court held that product 
packaging, in this case,  restaurant décor, may be inherently distinctive and 
therefore, immediately protectable without a showing of secondary 
meaning.202  
 Eight years later, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 
Inc.,203 the Supreme Court determined the circumstances in which a 
product’s design, as opposed to its packaging, is distinctive and therefore 
protectable in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress.  
Samara Brothers, Inc. was a manufacturer of children’s clothing.204  Wal-
Mart took pictures of Samara’s designs and had its clothing manufacturer 
produce a very similar line of clothing, which Wal-Mart then sold.205  
Samara brought an action for trade dress infringement.206  Wal-Mart 
defended on the ground that Samara’s clothing design had not acquired 
secondary meaning, and therefore was not protectable.207  The Supreme 
Court agreed, concluding that product design, like color,208 can never be 
inherently distinctive.209  In so ruling, the Court distinguished the product 
 
and Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 143 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1944) (raisin 
bran). 
197 Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1994) (pictures 
and graphics on packages of candy); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987) (antifreeze bottles); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. 
Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987) (restaurant design); Chevron Chem. Co. 
v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981) (bottles of insect 
spray and packaging for bone meal). 
198 Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd, 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 
1999) (bedroom furniture); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 
1995) (sweaters); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(notebooks). 
199 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
200 Id. at 765. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 776. 
203 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
204 Id. at 207. 
205 Id. at 207–08. 
206 Id. at 208. 
207 Id. 
208 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (finding that 
color can never be inherently distinctive but may receive trademark protection 
upon a showing that it has acquired secondary meaning). 
209 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 216. 




design involved in Wal-Mart from the product packaging involved in Two 
Pesos.210  In short, while product packaging may be immediately 
protectable by trademark if it is inherently distinctive, the design of a 
product itself may never be protectable by trademark unless and until it 
has acquired secondary meaning. 
 Functionality is another limitation to the availability of trade dress 
protection for packaging and product design.  In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
Marketing Displays, Inc.,211 the Supreme Court noted that § 1125(a)(3) of 
the Lanham Act does not allow trade dress protection for functional 
product features.212  In TrafFix Devices, the plaintiff had acquired utility 
patents for a dual spring design for outdoor signs.213  After the patents 
expired, the plaintiff sued a competitor using a similar design for trade 
dress infringement.214  The Court held that a utility patent was strong 
evidence that the features claimed were functional.215  In this case, the dual 
spring design was both the central claim advanced in the expired patents 
and the essential feature of the alleged trade dress.216  Because the 
defendant established functionality, the Court held that the trade dress 
claim was barred.217  
 Likewise, in the context of food products, the non-functionality of 
a particular design or packaging is required for protection as trade dress.  
In Application of World’s Finest Chocolate, Inc.,218 the court held that the 
packaging of a chocolate candy bar was not functional because it provided 
no utilitarian advantages; meanwhile, other packaging designs were 
available.219  By contrast, in Universal Frozen Foods, Co. v. Lamb-
Weston, Inc.,220 the product design for the shape of “curlicue fries” was 
found to be functional because the configuration resulted in “superior 
yield, lower portion cost, better cosmetic plate coverage, improved flavor, 
faster service time and better heat penetration.”221 
 Food designs that have federally registered trademarks include: 
Pepperidge Farm’s Milano Cookies,222 Carvel’s Fudgie the Whale Ice 
 
210 The Court noted that product design almost always serves purposes other than 
source identification, including aesthetic purposes.  Id. at 213. 
211 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
212 Id. at 29. 
213 Id. at 25. 
214 Id. at 26.   
215 Id. at 29–30. 
216 Id. at 30. 
217 Id. at 29–30, 33.   
218 474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
219 Id. at 1014–15.   
220 697 F. Supp. 389 (D. Or. 1987). 
221 Id. at 392.   Accord Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 
569, 572–73 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding neither proof of secondary meaning nor that 
Pepto-Bismol’s pink color was entitled to trademark protection because it served 
the functional purpose of giving the medicine a more pleasing appearance and 
therefore more likely to be accepted by an upset stomach). 
222 Registration No. 3,852,499.  In December 2015, Pepperidge Farm sued 
Trader Joe’s for selling Milano cookies that Pepperidge Farm claimed infringed 
its trademark.  The lawsuit was settled by the parties.  David Godman, Trader 
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Cream Cake,223 Dairy Queen ice cream curl on top,224 Hershey’s kisses,225 
Hershey’s chocolate bar,226 Frito Lay Sun Chips,227 Izzy’s ice cream shop 
for ice cream cones topped with a baby scoop of ice cream,228 J. Dawgs 
for hotdogs with crisscross cuts,229 General Mills’ Bugles,230 Tootsie Rolls 
Tootsie Pops,231 and Magnolia Bakery’s cupcakes bearing its signature 
swirl icing.232  
2.  Trademark Infringement 
 The Lanham Act permits the holder of a registered trademark to 
file a trademark infringement claim against any person who, without the 
registered trademark holder’s consent, uses “in commerce any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark 
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”233  The plaintiff in 
a trademark infringement action must prove that the mark is valid,234 the 
 
Joe’s settles Milano cookies infringement spat, CNN BUS. (Mar. 31, 2016, 9:19 
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/03/31/news/companies/trader-joes-milano-
pepperidge-farm/index.html. 
223 Registration No. 3,094,986. 
224 Registration No. 2,183,417. 
225 Registration No. 2,138,566. 
226 Registration No. 4,322,502. 
227 Registration No. 3,293,236. 
228 Registration No. 4,078,826. 
229 Registration No. 4,550,211. 
230 Registration No. 1,929,420. 
231 Registration No. 1,459,412. 
232 Registration No. 4,519,385 (Supplemental Register).  Magnolia Bakery sued 
one of its former employees who had opened a competing café for selling 
cupcakes with swirl icing.  The former employee went out of business. Eliza 
Murphy, Magnolia Bakery in Buttercream Battle with Former Employee, ABC 
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012) https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/lifestyle/2012/09/magnolia-
bakery-in-buttercream-battle-with-former-employee. 
233 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2018).  A prevailing party in a trademark infringement 
action may:  
[R]ecover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the 
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. . . . .  In assessing profits the 
plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant 
must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing 
damages the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances 
of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not 
exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount 
of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the 
court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall 
find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case . . . .  The court 
in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. 
Id. § 1117(a).  The infringing items may also be ordered destroyed.  Id. § 1118. 
234 Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
threshold requirement [is] that the plaintiff must possess a protectable mark, 
which must be satisfied before infringement can be actionable.”).  Federally 
registered marks are presumed to be valid.  See supra, note 183. 




plaintiff is the senior user of the mark, and the defendant’s use of the mark 
creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the consumer.235  
Therefore, trademark infringement actions focus on whether the consumer 
is likely to be confused as to the source of a product or service by a party’s 
use of a particular mark.236 
   The likelihood of confusion test was applied in a case involving 
food design in Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Conusa Corp.,237 where the trial 
court found that defendant’s sale of a round hard candy with a hole in the 
middle infringed upon the trademark of the LifeSaver candy.238 The court 
rejected the defendant’s contention that because its candy had raised letters 
on one side, it was sufficiently different from the LifeSaver candy so as 
not to create a likelihood of confusion.239 More recently, in Denbra IP 
 
235 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).  See also Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. IJR Capital Invs. 
L.L.C., 891 F.3d 178, 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the plaintiff must show 
confusion to prevail); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 516–17 
(10th Cir. 1987) (citing LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 
1985)) (stating that confusion is required to succeed for a trade dress 
infringement); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]o prevail on a trade dress infringement claim under § 43(a) [of the Lanham 
Act], the plaintiff must prove three elements: 1) its trade dress is inherently 
distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, 2) its trade dress is primarily non-
functional, and 3) the defendant's trade dress is confusingly similar.”). 
236 In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs., Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a multi-factor test to determine 
whether a particular use of a mark creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds 
of the consumer.  The Second Circuit considers: 
[T]he strength of [the] mark, the degree of similarity between the two 
marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner 
will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s 
good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, 
and the sophistication of the buyers.   
Id.  Most Circuits follow a similar multi-factor test in determining likelihood of 
confusion.  See, e.g., Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371–73 
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Four-U-Packaging, Inc., 
701 F.3d 1093, 1100–01 (6th Cir. 2012); Pizzaria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 
1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d 
Cir. 1983); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 
1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. 
Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981)); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up, Co., 
628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).  See also In re 
E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Stone Lion 
Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (relying on 
the multifactor test from In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. to assess an 
application for trademark registration).  Not all factors are relevant to every case 
and the courts may give the factors different weight depending on the facts of the 
particular case.  See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361–62; 
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP, 701 F.3d at 1100–01. 
237 722 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D.N.C. 1989), aff’d, 892 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1989). 
238 Id. at 1291–92. 
239 Id. at 1289, 1291. 
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Holdings, LLC v. Thornton,240 the trial court issued a preliminary 
injunction against the defendant’s use of a frosting pattern on Bundt cakes 
that was likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff’s frosting design.241 
3.  Trademark Dilution 
An owner of a “famous” mark may also have a cause of action for 
dilution against another party’s use of an identical or substantially similar 
mark if the other party’s use of the mark hurts the value of the famous 
mark by harming its reputation or impairing its distinctiveness.242  “[A] 
mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public 
. . . as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s 
owner.”243  Unlike a trademark infringement claim, a cause of action for 
dilution may exist regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely 
confusion, competition, or actual economic injury.244  
 There are two types of causes of action for trademark dilution: 
tarnishment and blurring.   In a tarnishment action, the issue is whether an 
“association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and 
a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”245  In a 
 
240 No. 4:20-CV-813-SDJ, 2021 WL 674238 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2021). 
241 Id. at 9. 
242 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
243 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of 
recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the 
following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising 
and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner 
or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales 
of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual 
recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the mark was registered . . . . 
Id. 
244 Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
245 Id. § 125(c)(2)(C).  Because tarnishment relates to reputation and 
distinctiveness, cases often involve the use of a mark or substantially similar mark 
in connection with some sex-related product.  See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 
v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387–89 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the use of the 
names “Victor’s Little Secret” or “Victor’s Secret” in connection with a store 
selling sex toys and other sex-related products created a likelihood of dilution by 
tarnishment to the Victoria’s Secret trademark that the defendant had not 
overcome); Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that the display of a Viagra-branded missile at “an adult entertainment 
exhibition,” among other places, would likely dilute by tarnishment Pfizer’s 
famous mark); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that a pornographic website’s use of “King VelVeeda” 
likely tarnished Kraft’s “Velveeta” trademark).  Tarnishment has also been found 
when a mark or substantially similar mark is used in connection with an inferior 
product or creates a negative association.  See, e.g., Perkins Sch. for the Blind v. 
Maxi-Aids, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the 
complaint’s allegation that the defendant resold the plaintiff’s product with an 
inferior warranty sufficiently alleged a claim for tarnishment); Harris Rsch., Inc. 
v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. Utah 2007) (finding that the defendant’s 
use of the mark “Chem-Who?” created a negative association with plaintiff’s 
“Chem-Dry” mark sufficient for tarnishment). 




blurring action, the issue is whether there is an “association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”246   
 Dilution in the food design context was the issue in Nabisco v. PF 
Brands.247  This case centered on a goldfish-shaped orange cracker.  
Pepperidge Farm had produced goldfish crackers continuously since 1962 
and owned numerous trademark registrations for the appearance and name 
of the cracker.248  In 1994, Pepperidge Farm launched an aggressive 
marketing campaign of its goldfish cracker, targeted at children.249  The 
cracker had also been the subject of substantial media coverage.250  In 
1998, Nickelodeon Television Network approached Nabisco to explore a 
joint promotion for its show, “CatDog.”251  Nabisco developed a CatDog 
snack that consisted of small orange crackers in three shapes: the CatDog 
character, a bone, and a fish.252  After Pepperidge Farm sent Nabisco a 
cease and desist letter, Nabisco brought a cause of action for declaratory 
relief.253  Pepperidge Farm countersued for trademark infringement and 
 
246 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).   
In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution 
by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the 
following: (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name 
and the famous mark. (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness of the famous mark. (iii) The extent to which the owner 
of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the 
mark. (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. (v) Whether 
the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with 
the famous mark. (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade 
name and the famous mark.   
Id.  See, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1089, 1091–92 
(9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant’s use of the name “eVisa” for an online 
education business diluted the plaintiff’s “Visa” trademark by creating a new 
meaning of the word); Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1179–
81 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the name “Perfumebay” diluted the uniqueness of 
eBay’s trademark); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1868, 
1886, 1888–90 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (finding that Mattel’s use of the trademark 
“Motown Metal” on its Hot Wheels cars was likely to dilute the “Motown” 
trademark); Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1479, 1486, 1497 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (finding that the use of the slogan “The Other 
Red Meat” for fresh and frozen salmon was likely to dilute the trademark “The 
Other White Meat”).  
247191 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2003) (holding that proof of actual 
dilution is required by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act).  Congress 
subsequently amended the federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 to provide that 
a “likelihood of dilution by tarnishment” is the applicable burden of proof.  See V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 387. 
248 Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 212. 
249 Id. at 212–13. 
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dilution under state and federal law, and sought a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting Nabisco from distributing the CatDog snack.254  
 The trial court denied the preliminary injunction on Pepperidge 
Farm’s infringement claim, but granted it on the dilution claim.255  Nabisco 
appealed.256  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a 
preliminary judgment after reviewing the relevant factors, concluding that 
“Pepperidge Farm has demonstrated a high likelihood of success in 
proving that Nabisco’s commercial use of its goldfish shape will dilute the 
distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm’s nearly identical famous senior 
mark.”257 
II. SHOULD THERE BE LIMITATIONS ON OR CHANGES TO THE 
AVAILABILITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR 
RECIPES AND FOOD DESIGN? 
 We now turn to the overarching questions of whether there should 
be intellectual property protection for recipes and food design at all and, if 
so, under what circumstances.  In addition, we consider whether the 
interests of competition as well as innovation are furthered by such 
protection.  We proceed first by arguing that a combination of intellectual 
property protections may best suit recipes and food design.  We then 
consider potential changes to the current state of protections, as outlined 
above, through a series of three questions.  First, should food be considered 
an article of manufacture for design patent purposes?  Second, should food 
design be considered functional and therefore not eligible for design patent 
or trademark protection?  Third, should doctrinal bootstrapping be 
eliminated? 
A. There is No Single Solution for the Protection of Recipes and 
Food Designs 
 As can be seen from the previous discussion, intellectual property 
protection for food design is extremely varied as to its scope and 
availability.  There is no one size that fits all purposes, and the form of 
intellectual property protection that works best will likely depend heavily 
on the context.  Recipes, to the extent that they are unique and kept 
confidential, are good candidates for trade secret protection, which can last 
as long as the recipe remains secret.  The recipe owner must implement 
measures that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy.  On the downside, trade secret protection is easily lost if the recipe 
is disclosed, and there is no way to prevent a competitor from 
independently developing the same recipe or reverse engineering it, 
neither of which will lead to liability for misappropriation. 
 The alternatives to trade secret protection are copyright and utility 
patent protection, which are both considered robust forms of intellectual 
property because of their exclusivity and the rights conferred.  While long 




256 Id. at 212. 
257 Id. at 222.  




expression only and does not apply to facts, procedures, and methods.258  
Thus, copyright may protect a recipe’s original, artistic, or creative 
elements, but not the underlying recipe itself, which is likely to be a list of 
ingredients and a procedure for combining them.  On the other hand, a 
compilation of recipes may be copyrightable if there is demonstrated 
originality in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of the recipes.259  
Even so, the recipes themselves will remain uncopyrightable.   
 Utility patent protection remains the other alternative to trade 
secret protection because it is available for processes and methods, and it 
is more likely to apply to the process for producing a food product or a 
particular ingredient than the dish itself.260  Nevertheless, utility patent 
protection has several practical drawbacks.  The process of obtaining a 
patent can be lengthy and expensive.  Moreover, recipes must be publicly 
disclosed as part of the examination process—rendering the requirements 
of novelty and nonobviousness a steep hill to climb.261  Even if a recipe is 
truly new because it involves a previously unknown cooking technique or 
combination of ingredients, it may amount to an obvious or predictable 
variation on other known recipes.262  In addition, the term of utility patent 
protection is limited to twenty years, after which the recipe falls into the 
public domain and becomes freely available.263 
 When it comes to food design, trade secret protection holds 
limited value if the trade secret is identified as the appearance or 
configuration of the food item itself.264  Trade secrets cannot protect what 
is easily observable—although the process of creating the design might be 
protectable if it has economic value is due to its secrecy.265  Likewise, 
copyright protection is not particularly useful because food is perishable, 
and therefore it cannot fulfill the requirement that the work be fixed in a 
medium that is sufficiently stable and permanent.266  In addition, the design 
or presentation of the dish, even if it is independently identifiable, may not 
be separable from the food itself as viewed as an edible, useful article.267 
 
258 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990). 
259 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
260 Daniel Joshua Ganz, Comment, Intellectual Property Protection for Food: 
Balancing Competing Policy Objectives, 40 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 128, 132 
(2019). 
261 See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
262 See Naomi Straus, Comment, Trade Dress Protection for Cuisine: Monetizing 
Creativity in a Low-IP Industry, 60 UCLA L. REV. 182, 198 (2012) (citing 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102–103) (arguing that “patent laws cannot be used to protect restaurant 
dishes that are created using classic cooking techniques or fail to meet the high 
standards of originality that the patent system requires because these dishes do not 
fulfill the requirement that an invention be novel and nonobvious”). 
263 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
264 See UTSA § 1(4)(i). 
265 Id. 
266 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
267 But see Hannah Brown, Having Your Cake and Eating it Too: Intellectual 
Property Protection for Cake Design, 56 IDEA 31, 53–54 (2016) (arguing that 
cake icing designs are independently identifiable and separable from the cake as 
a useful article). 
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 Instead, design patent or trade dress protection may be the 
preferred option for food designs.  Design patents will allow the patent 
owner to exclude others from making, using, or selling food items 
incorporating the design.  Of course, to be protected, the design must first 
overcome the high bars of novelty and nonobviousness; and be ornamental 
rather than related to any functional aspect of the food.  As with utility 
patents, the term of protection is limited, and even more so since the 
duration for a design patent is fifteen years.268  Lastly, trade dress 
protection is also a viable option.  The design must be have acquired 
secondary meaning to have become distinctive to the source or supplier of 
the food.269   
 Additionally, as with design patent protection, the food design 
must be nonfunctional, both as to any utilitarian purpose related to the food 
and as to any aesthetic necessity.270  Once a food design qualifies for trade 
dress protection, it will remain protected as long as it remains in 
commercial use.271  A product can be protected by a design patent and by 
trade dress rights as long as the particular design does not have a utilitarian 
function.272  In fact, the existence of a design patent covering a product is 
a factor that can lead to a presumption of nonfunctionality for trade dress 
purposes.273  As this discussion suggests, recipes and food designs might 
be best protected by a combination of intellectual property rights. 
B. Should Food be Considered an Article of Manufacture for Design 
Patent Purposes? 
Design patents are limited to designs for “articles of 
manufacture.”274  What constitutes an article of manufacture is not 
statutorily defined.275 The Supreme Court defined an “article of 
manufacture” as “the production of articles for use from raw or prepared 
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties or 
combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.”276  However, not 
 
268 35 U.S.C. § 173. 
269 See supra notes 203–210 and accompanying text. 
270 See infra notes 295–324 and accompanying text. 
271 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059. 
272 See, e.g., In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964); 
Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL 719381 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
273 See In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Am. 
Beverage Corp. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 555 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
274 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
275 For a discussion of the historical meaning of article of manufacture, see Sarah 
Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 781, 812–
817 (2018). 
276 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Am. Fruit 
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).  See also Tide-Water Oil 
Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 210, 216 (1898) (“The primary meaning of the 
word ‘manufacture’ is something made by hand, as distinguished from a natural 
growth, but, as machinery has largely supplanted this primitive method, the word 
is now ordinarily used to denote an article upon the material of which labor has 
been expended to make the finished product.”).  More recently, the Supreme Court 
looked to dictionary definitions of “article” and “manufacture,” and took the 




every article of manufacture is eligible for design patent protection.  
Articles of manufacture, which are more or less hidden from view when 
in use, are not the proper subject matter for design patents.277  Similarly, 
designs that create an appearance that cannot “ever really matter to 
anybody” have been denied patents.278  
Further, courts have held that to be a “manufacture” or an “article 
of manufacture,” some form of permanence is required.  In re Nuijten279 
involved a utility patent application for a signal with an embedded digital 
watermark encoded.  The court was called on to determine whether the 
signals fell within any of the categories for utility patent eligibility.280  In 
addressing whether the signals were “manufactures,” the Nuijten majority 
conceded that the signals were man-made, but held that some article must 
result from the process of manufacture.281  The court also held that articles 
of manufacture must be tangible and have some “semblance of 
permanence.”282  The court concluded that the signals were not 
manufactures and therefore not eligible for utility patent protection.283 
Some forty years earlier, the court reviewing a design patent 
application in In re Hruby284 found, in connection with a design patent 
application, that the portion of a water fountain that was composed entirely 
of water in motion was an “article of manufacture.”285  While at first blush, 
Nuijten and Hruby appear to be inconsistent, there is some similarity in 
their holdings.  Like Nuijten, Hruby placed importance on “permanence” 
in reaching its holding.  The court noted that the dissenting member of the 
Patent Office Board of Appeals (which had rejected the design patent) had 
stated: “it is recognized that if certain parameters such as orifice 
configuration, water pressure and freedom from disturbing atmospheric 
conditions are maintained, the ornamental shape of the fountain will 
remain substantially constant and will at times present an over-all 
appearance virtually the same from day to day.”286  The court agreed with 
this statement of permanence of design: “We agree with the dissenter on 
that and would add that the permanence of any design is a function of the 
 
broad view that an article of manufacture is simply a thing made by hand or 
machine.  Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016).  
277 E.g., Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1901) (horseshoe 
calk—a blunt projection on a horseshoe to provide traction—unpatentable); 
Bradley v. Eccles, 126 F. 945 (2d Cir. 1903) (washer for thill coupling 
unpatentable); Pashek v. Dunlop Tyre & Rubber Co., 8 F.2d 640 (N.D. Ohio 
1925) (tire tread unpatentable). 
278 N. British Rubber Co. v. Racine Rubber Tire Co. of N.Y., Inc., 271 F. 936, 938 
(2d Cir. 1921) (“It has been well said that there are some articles of manufacture 
. . . incapable of being the subjects of design patents, for want of reason to suppose 
that their appearance can ever really matter to anybody.”). 
279 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
280 Id. at 1348. 
281 Id. at 1356. 
282 Id. (“In essence, energy embodying the claimed signal is fleeting and is devoid 
of any semblance of permanence during transmission.”). 
283 Id. at 1357. 
284 373 F.2d 997 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1967). 
285 Id. at 1002. 
286 Id. at 999. 
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materials in which it is embodied and the effects of the environment 
thereon.”287  The court then pointed to Roman and French fountains that 
were built hundreds of years ago that still produce the same water design 
today.288 
Both Nuijten and Hruby conclude that an article of manufacture 
must exhibit a degree of tangibility and permanence.  Copyright and 
design patent would then share similar requirements of fixation in a 
tangible medium.289  The Court’s recognition that articles of manufacture 
be “fixed” in the copyright sense acknowledges the inherent overlap 
between design patent and copyright protection, namely their use to 
protect the aesthetically pleasing aspects of a utilitarian article.290  In fact, 
design patents had their antecedents in the law of copyright.291  If 
tangibility and permanence are necessary to qualify for design patent 
protection, then one must ask whether food design also qualifies.  Recall 
the holding of Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc.292 that food is not 
 
287 Id. 
288 Id.  Rather than examining Hruby in any depth, the Nuijten Court attempted to 
distinguish it on the grounds that Hruby was addressing a design patent, while 
Nuijten was addressing a utility patent.  This is a distinction without meaning.  
The notion that there is a difference between “manufacture” as used with utility 
patents and “articles of manufacture” as used with design patents was rejected as 
early as In re Hadden, 20 F.2d 275, 276 (App. D.C. 1927) (“It is difficult to 
perceive how a thing may be a manufacture, without producing an article of 
manufacture.”).  See also Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 
(2016) (interpretation of “article of manufacture” in design patent and 
“manufacture” in utility patent is consistent); 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 
23.03[2] (2013) (noting that “article of manufacture” in §171 includes what would 
be considered a “manufacture” within the meaning of § 101). 
289 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
290 For a discussion of the intersection between design patents and copyrights, see 
Valerie V. Flugge, Note, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright 
Protection, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245–47 (1982).  Because both protect the 
aesthetic features of functional articles, copyright and patents have significant 
overlap between the subject matter they protect.  By contrast, proving design 
patent infringement is less demanding than that required for copyright 
infringement.  Design patent infringement focuses on whether the ordinary 
observer would believe that the accused design is the same as the overall patented 
design based on their similarities.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 
F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding “that the ‘ordinary observer’ test should 
be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed”).  
Copyright infringement requires proof that the defendant had access to the 
copyrighted work and that the similarities between the copyrighted work and the 
allegedly infringing work are substantial.  E.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (assessing whether a taken portion of a 
copyrighted literary work was substantial).  For further discussion of the 
similarities and differences in design patent and copyright infringement, see 
Sebastian M. Torres Rodriguez, The Convergence of Design Patent Law, 
Trademark Law, and Copyright Law for Better Protection of Intellectual Property 
for Commercial Designs, 5 U. P.R. BUS. L. J. 122, 139–42 (2014). 
291 See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent 
Protection, 88 IND. L. J. 837, 856–63 (2013) (discussing the historical 
development of design patents as originating in British design copyright law). 
292 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 




eligible for copyright protection because it is intended to be eaten, and thus 
not stable or permanent enough to be a work of fixed authorship.293  By 
analogy, food is insufficiently stable or permanent enough to be an article 
of manufacture. 
Additionally, at least one commentator has argued that 
compositions of matter should not be considered an article of 
manufacture.294  Professor Sarah Burstein, who has written extensively on 
the meaning of the term, suggests that we should revert to the original 
definition of “article of manufacture,” which excluded machines and 
compositions of matter because they are not complete, unitary 
structures.295  Similarly, such a construction would exclude food design 
from design patent protection. 
C. Should Food Design be Considered Functional and Therefore 
Not Eligible for Design Patent or Trademark Protection? 
Nonfunctionality is a key requirement for both design patent and 
trade dress protection.296  The standard of functionality as between these 
two forms of intellectual property differ significantly.  In the design patent 
context, the definition of functionality is narrow.297  By nature, an article 
of manufacture incudes both utilitarian and ornamental features.298  A 
leading test specifies that a design is functional only if it is “dictated by 
function.”299  In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,300 the 
Supreme Court held that “[t]o qualify for protection, a design must present 
an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function 
alone.”301  Therefore, if a particular design is dictated solely by the use or 
purpose of the article, it cannot be protected by a design patent.302  
 
293 Id. at 1054. 
294 Burstein, supra note 275, at 5.  A “composition of matter” is a mixture or 
combination of substances or elements.  Saunders, supra note 35, at 108.  
295 Burstein, supra note 275, at 5 (“[I]n 1887, the phrase ‘article of manufacture’ 
was a term of art in U.S. patent law that referred to a tangible item made by 
humans—other than a machine or composition of matter—that had a unitary 
structure and was complete in itself for use or for sale.”). 
296 See supra notes 134–136, 211–217 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text. 
298 The scope of design patent protection for an article having both functional and 
ornamental features is limited strictly to the ornamental features.  See Richardson 
v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing L.A. Gear, 
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
299 Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 277, 287 (2013) (citing Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 
1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 
U.S. 141, 148 (1989)).  See, e.g., In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(discussing but not ruling on the issue of functionality as not raised on appeal). 
300 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
301 Id. at 148. 
302 See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 
1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing functionality for design patents); Rosco, 304 
F.3d at 1378 (assessing the functionality of a mirror for design patent purposes); 
L.A. Gear, Inc., 988 F.2d at 1123 (discussing the overlap between design and 
function for a shoe). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 190  
 
Consequently, there is likely more room for protectability with a design 
patent because it is often relatively easy to find some nonfunctional 
motivation for a design.303  
 Regarding trade dress, the test is somewhat inverted from that of 
the design patent test.  Proof of nonfunctionality generally requires a 
showing that the design of the product “serves no purpose other than 
identification.”304 Thus, two tests for determining functionality with 
respect to trade dress have developed.  First, the traditional test asks 
whether a design is essential to the use or purpose of the article, or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the article.305  This form of functionality is 
known as utilitarian functionality.306  Strong evidence of utilitarian 
functionality is found when there is a utility patent that specifically 
discloses the utilitarian advantages of features sought to be protected as 
trade dress.307  Another indication of utilitarian functionality is the 
unavailability of alternative comparable designs or features that may be 
used by competitors.308  Advertising that touts the usefulness of a 
particular design and that it resulted from a relatively simple or 
inexpensive method of manufacture is also relevant in assessing utilitarian 
functionality.309 
 Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte International America 
Corp.310 is an example of utilitarian functionality as applied to food.  Ezaki 
Glico involved “Pocky,” a chocolate-covered cookie stick with one end 
uncoated with chocolate.  Ezaki Glico, the creator and manufacturer, 
claimed trade dress protection for the shape and appearance of the cookie 
sticks.311  However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the design 
was utilitarian because the uncoated end of the stick allows the consumers 
to hold it without getting chocolate on their hands as they eat it.312  
Evidence cited by the court included that the manufacturer advertised “‘the 
no mess handle of the Pocky stick,’ which ‘mak[es] it easier for multi-
tasking without getting chocolate on your hands.’”313  Therefore, the 
overall shape and look of Pocky was deemed to be functional.  Similarly, 
 
303 Lee and Sunder, supra note 299, at 286–87. 
304 SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab’ys, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980). 
305 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (C.C.P.A. 
1982). 
306 See Saunders, supra note 35, at 543. 
307 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30–31 (2001) 
(stating that “[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed 
are functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong 
evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the 
statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise 
by the party seeking trade dress protection”); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 
615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing TrafFix Devices). 
308 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnard Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
309 Id. 
310 977 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2020), rehearing granted and opinion vacated by Ezaki 
Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp, 985 F.3d 1069 (3d Cir. 2021) 
(mem.). 
311 Id. at 263. 
312 Id. at 268–69. 
313 Id. at 269 (citations omitted). 




in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC,314 the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the design of Dippin’ Dots—small, 
predominately separated colored beads or pieces of ice cream—
contributed to the product’s creamy taste and was thus functional and not 
entitled to trade dress protection. 315  Finally, in William R. Warner & Co. 
v. Eli Lilly & Co.,316 the Supreme Court concluded that adding chocolate 
to a pharmaceutical mixture containing quinine to enhance color and offset 
the mixture’s unpleasant taste was functional.317   
 The second nonfunctionality test is the competitive necessity test, 
which asks whether the exclusive use of the design would put competitors 
at a significant non-reputational disadvantage.318  Aesthetic functionality, 
the second form of functionality, concerns a product’s required look—the 
color and other design features provide an appearance that is essential to 
the product and must be available to competitors.319  Often, this is 
important when the product is purchased because of its visual appearance 
or aesthetic appeal.  In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc v. Godinger 
Silver Art, Co., Inc.,320 for instance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that baroque patterns in the form of curls, scrolls, and flowers on the 
handles of silverware were aesthetically functional features to the 
appearance of baroque-style silverware, no matter the source of the 
patterns.321  Consequently, the color white is aesthetically functional for 
the color of icing on wedding cakes because white is the traditional color 
associated with bridal gowns and weddings in western cultures.  In 
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,322 for instance, the Second 
Circuit found the pink color of Pepto-Bismol unprotectable trade dress 
 
314 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004). 
315 Id. at 1206.  The court also ruled that the color of ice cream was functional 
because it indicated the flavor of the ice cream.  Id. at 1204.  Note that flavors are 
generally not protected as trademarks because consumers do not perceive them as 
trademarks.  See, e.g., In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1649 (T.T.A.B. 
2006); see generally Leigha Santoro, Note, A Tasteful Expansion of the Already 
Full Plate of Intellectual Property, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 171 (2019); Amanda E. 
Compton, Acquiring a Flavor for Trademarks: There’s No Common Taste in the 
World, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340 (2010). 
316 265 U.S. 526 (1924). 
317 Id. at 529 (“Chocolate is used as an ingredient, not alone for the purpose of 
imparting a distinctive color, but for the purpose of also making the preparation 
peculiarly agreeable to the palate, to say nothing of its effect as a suspending 
medium. While it is not a medicinal element in the preparation, it serves a 
substantial and desirable use, which prevents it from being a mere matter of 
dress.”). 
318 See Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 1039 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the design of a composite steel floor deck profile was functional 
because it added to the quality and strength of the deck). 
319 See Saunders, supra note 35, at 549–50. 
320 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990). 
321 Id. at 81. 
322 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959) 
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since pink soothed and pleased consumers with upset stomachs.323  
Further, in McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners LLC,324 the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that color-coding of various 
artificial sweeteners was an industry standard that consumers relied on to 
differentiate their chemical compositions.325 
 Therefore, since many food designs also help make food more 
attractive or fun to eat, a strong argument can be made that food design is 
not solely to help consumers identify a food product’s origin.  It is safe to 
assume no manufacturer of a food product would choose an unappetizing 
design for the sake of source identification.  Take, for example, the Bubba 
Burger.  The Bubba Burger is a perforated and irregularly-shaped frozen 
hamburger patty.  The trademark application for its product design was 
published for opposition on February 12, 2019.326  Bubba Foods was then 
required to demonstrate that its perforated patty shape was not 
functional.327  In response, Bubba Foods submitted declarations not only 
detailing how the unique shape of the burgers lacked functionality in taste 
or texture but also added to the cost of their manufacture.328  The examiner 
later found the mark entitled to registration.329  But there are more 
functionality issues at work here.   
First, even though the Bubba Burger shape is “irregular,” the 
options for modifying the shape are curtailed by the limitations on 
creativity rendered by the traditional hamburger bun, which it must fit to 
be commercially viable.  Second, while Bubba Foods produced evidence 
that the unusual shape of the burger did not contribute to taste or texture, 
that does not address aesthetic functionality.330  This absence raises several 
questions.  Does the unusual shape make the burger more appealing and 
interesting to eat?  Will Bubba Burger now have the right to the exclusive 
use of an irregular-shaped hamburger patty?  Will the rest of the burger 
manufacturers be constrained to the use of a round or square patty?  Does 
that put competitors at a significant non-reputational related disadvantage?  
As these questions suggest, while not all food designs are functional, it is 
likely that a great number of food designs would fail the aesthetic 
functionality test.  Conversely, given the more relaxed functionality 
standard for design patents,331 food designs seeking patent protection 
 
323 Id. at 572 (pink color was designed to present a pleasing appearance to the 
customer and the sufferer; “a disordered stomach will accept that which is 
pleasing and reject that which is repulsive”). 
324 512 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
325 See id. at 222. 
326 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87815098 (filed Feb. 28, 2018). 
327 Tommy Tobin & Jeannie Heffernan, Want Fries With that Trademark?, A.B.A. 




329 The mark consists of the configuration of a hamburger patty, Registration No. 
5742743. 
330 See supra notes 318–25 and accompanying text. 
331 See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text. 




would likely meet the test in most instances—further underscoring the 
uneven overlay between trade dress and design patents. 
D. Should Doctrinal Bootstrapping be Eliminated? 
The Supreme Court stated in Wal-Mart v. Samara, that if a product 
design really were inherently source identifying but had not yet acquired 
secondary meaning, the owner could obtain a design patent or copyright 
protection in lieu of a trademark.332  This statement conflates the purposes 
and elements of intellectual property protection.  Trademark law is 
concerned with product identification and preventing consumer 
confusion.333  Meanwhile, copyright law and patent law encourage and 
reward creativity and invention.334  Consequently, there is no requirement 
under either law that the work or design be inherently source 
identifying.335  Any product design, whether inherently source identifying 
or not, is eligible for design patent or copyright protection, assuming the 
requirements for such protections are met.336 
Instead, in Wal-Mart v. Samara, the Supreme Court drew a map 
for how an owner of a product design that is not inherently source 
identifying may use the design patent period to acquire the secondary 
meaning necessary to obtain trademark protection.  The owner of a product 
design may apply for a design patent.337  If successful, the owner will be 
able to keep all competitors from the market for the term of the design 
patent and use that time to develop secondary meaning without any threat 
of competition.338  Once secondary meaning is established, the owner can 
then apply for trademark registration, which, unlike a design patent, can 
last indefinitely.339 
In fact, empirical evidence shows that design patents are relatively 
easy to obtain. One empirical study showed that nearly eighty-two percent 
of design patent applications are approved without any objection from the 
U.S Patent and Trademark Office.340  Over ninety percent of those design 
 
332 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000). 
333 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–65 (1995) 
(outlining the purpose of trademark law and comparing its purpose to that of 
patent law). 
334 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8 cl. 8). 
335 Otherwise stated, a trademark is neither a “writing” nor an “invention” within 
the meaning of copyright and patent law.  See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 
(1879).  
336 See supra notes 35–39, 126–128 and accompanying text. 
337 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
338 Patents give the owner a negative monopoly, allowing the owner to exclude all 
others from the use of the design.  United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 
287, 308 (1948); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1). Further, patents carry a presumption of 
validity that can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence.  Microsoft 
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P‘ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 
339 This situation is not unique to food design; it applies to any product design. 
340 See Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights 19 
(Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 2010-17, 2010 (available at https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1469&context=facpubs)). 
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patents are eventually approved, compared with an approval rate of only 
forty-four percent for utility patents.341  Thus, other than the cost and time 
of obtaining a design patent, there seem to be few barriers for a party to 
developing secondary meaning during the design patent’s exclusivity 
period without interference by competitors. 
This ability to use the exclusivity period provided by a design 
patent to develop secondary meaning, or “doctrinal bootstrapping,” has 
been reviewed positively by some commentators.342  In contrast, another 
commentator has referred to reliance on design patents for an exclusivity 
period as “cheating the trademark system,” explaining that “[n]o other 
types of trademark rights enjoy this exclusivity period for establishing 
secondary meaning.”343  Recall also that an expired design patent creates 
a presumption of nonfunctionality if the patent protected design and 
proposed mark are identical, though this may be rebutted by other 
evidence pointing to the functionality of the design.344 
The ability to bootstrap a design patent into potentially indefinite 
trademark protection cuts against the policy tradeoffs underlying patent 
protection—in exchange for public disclosure, the owner is given a limited 
term of protection.345  As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. 
Dubilier Condenser Corp.,346 “upon the expiration of that [patent] period, 
the knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled 
without restrictions to practice it and profit by its use.”347  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of free public use once 
the term of the patent has expired.348 
 
341 Id. at 18. 
342 Id. at 31–32.  See also Elizabeth D. Ferrill & Danny M. Awdeh, What Do 
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term of the design patent.”). 
343 Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and 
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345 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining 
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(1964) (“[W]hen [a] patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and 
the right to make the article . . . passes to the public.”).  
348 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“First, 
patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of 
inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the 
invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent 




Many commentators have proposed that the scope of design patent 
protection be limited or even eliminated since design patents, copyright, 
and trademark protections overlap.349  One approach to eliminate this 
concern would be to have the product design owner choose between design 
patent, copyright, or trademark.  However, lower courts have rejected this 
“election” approach under the current statutory scheme.350  For instance, 
in Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., the now defunct the U.S. 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals observed that trademark rights do 
not “extend” the patent monopoly to justify the availability of trademark 
protection after the design patent expires.351  The court pointed out that 
while a design patent gives the owner a power to exclude others from using 
the design, a trademark owner must prove that another party’s subsequent 
design use creates customer confusion.352  While the Supreme Court has 
yet to rule on this issue, in TrafFix Devices, Inc.,353 the Court implied that 
successive trademark protection could be obtained were the requirements 
for such protection met, despite denying trademark protection on the 
grounds that the design at issue was functional.354  
However, permitting a design patent owner to bootstrap into 
trademark registration clashes with patent protection’s underlying policy 
concerns.  Once a patent term expires, the public is supposed to be enabled 
to practice the invention without restriction and to profit from its use.355  
The appropriate question then is whether successive trademark protection 
is consistent with the policies pursuant to which the patent monopoly was 
 
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free 
use of the public.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
157 (the “centerpiece of federal patent policy” is its “ultimate goal of public 
disclosure and use”).  
349 See Bream, supra note 343, at 326–28 (calling for the elimination of design 
patent protection and relying instead on copyright and trademark); Ralph D. 
Clifford & Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The Constitutionality of Design Patents, 14 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 553 (2015) (arguing that design patents are not 
authorized by the Constitution); Lee & Sunder, supra note 299, at 277 (arguing 
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350 See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In sum, courts 
have consistently held that a product’s different qualities can be protected 
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protection of intellectual property.”); Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding a design may be both the subject of copyright and 
design patent); see also 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS §7.91 (5th ed. 2021 
update) (“In the early years of the Lanham Act, the Patent Office held that a 
product or container design covered by a design patent was unregistrable as a 
trademark. But by 1959, the Office had changed its position.”). For a discussion 
of the benefits and detriments of overlapping intellectual property rights, see Viva 
R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of 
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1473 
(2004). 
351 328 F.2d 925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964).  
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353 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001). 
354 Id. at 29–30. 
355 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
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granted in the first place.  A trademark owner has the right to exclude 
others from using the product design upon a showing of the likelihood of 
confusion or, in the case of dilution, upon establishing that the trademark 
is famous.356  This right significantly restricts the public’s ability to profit 
from patented designs.   
In addition to whether doctrinal bootstrapping is consistent with 
patent law policies, fairness issues are also involved.  Blurring the patent 
and trademark laws may allow parties to game the system by providing 
unfair advantages to those who can leverage the market for the fifteen year  
patent exclusivity period to develop secondary meaning and thereafter 
secure trade dress protection. 
For our purposes, this problem would be eliminated if food design 
was protected by design patent or trade dress, but not both.  This article 
notes several ways that overlapping protections might be eliminated.  If 
food is excluded from categorization as an article of manufacture, it would 
not be eligible for design patent protection, leaving trade dress as the only 
form of intellectual property protection.  Conversely, if virtually all food 
design were deemed aesthetically functional, design patent protection 
would be available with limited to no trade dress protection.  However, if 
food is both (a) excluded from categorization as an article of manufacture 
and (b) almost always aesthetically functional, no intellectual property 
protection for food design at all could be another option.  
However, these solutions are not ideal.  Having no design patent 
protection would seem to be advantageous to larger companies and hurt 
smaller entrepreneurs, because the larger companies could copy a food 
design before it was able to acquire secondary meaning.  Although not 
involving food design, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.357 
presents a good example of how this could happen.  Wal-Mart 
intentionally copied Samara’s clothing designs before they were able to 
acquire secondary meaning.358  Providing no trade dress protection would 
present similar issues because protection for food design would then be 
limited to the fifteen-year term of a design patent, at which point it would 
be freely available to the public to use.  In instances where food design is 
clearly source identifying, such as with the Pepperidge Farm goldfish 
crackers, the policy of protecting against public confusion as to the source 
of the food product would not be served after the patent term expired.359  
The prospect of having no intellectual property protection for food design 
at all also does not seem reasonable. 
A possible solution to address these issues is to re-examine the 
wisdom of allowing the owner of a design patent to simultaneously or 
successively register the configuration as a trademark.  The U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office once prohibited a trademark registration to the 
owner of a design patent.360  While some lower courts have rejected this 
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approach, the issue has yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.361  This 
option would permit the owner of a food design to opt for design patent 
protection or trade dress protection, depending on which protection was 
best suited for their commercial needs.  It would also honor the underlying 
policies of each form of intellectual property.362  Patented design would 
become freely available to the public upon the expiration of the patent 
term, and trade dress would potentially indefinitely protect against 
confusion as to source of the product.  
CONCLUSION 
 Edible intellectual property seems like an unpalatable concept.  
Yet recipes and food designs are protectable by a range of intellectual 
property rights.  As we have seen, some forms of intellectual property are 
a better fit than others for recipes and food designs.  They are all subject 
to limitations, most notably as to their requirements and the scope of rights 
they afford.  Recipes that are not commonly known and kept confidential 
can be maintained as trade secrets and will be protected against 
unauthorized use or disclosure and improper acquisition.  Protection of 
recipes as processes and food designs by means of utility patents is a 
potential but difficult fit due to the exacting requirements of novelty and 
nonobviousness.  Copyright protection of recipes is mostly impossible 
except for original expression beyond the facts and procedures of the 
recipe itself, and for original compilations of recipes.   
 Food designs appear to be better suited to protection by design 
patents as to their ornamental aspects or, if they are distinctive as to their 
source, as trade dress.  For food designs, copyright protection is made 
impossible by the requirement of fixation and by the difficulty in 
separating purely expressive elements from the food design itself.  More 
notably, this article has explored whether there should be intellectual 
property protection for food design at all.  An additional question 
addressed is whether such broad protection is consistent with the law 
governing “articles of manufacture” and aesthetic functionality, and 
whether it serves or hinders the purposes of intellectual property protection 
and free competition.  Especially troublesome is the use of design patent 
protection as a backdoor into long-term trade dress protection.  Given how 
much people relish innovative cooking and unique culinary creations, 
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